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Strong, responsible unions are essential to industrial fair play.  Without them the labor 
bargain is wholly one-sided.  The parties to the labor contract must be nearly equal in strength if 
justice is to be worked out, and this means that the workers must be organized and that their 
organizations must be recognized by employers as a condition precedent to industrial peace.      
—Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
I. Introduction 
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is currently at a crossroads. It is 
a multibillion dollar industry, but maintains it is an amateur sport. Characterizing the NCAA 
model as an amateur sport while it reaps millions of dollars in profit annually presents a strange 
dichotomy. The CBS/Turner contract in the 2014 NCAA Men’s Basketball tournament was 
valued at $700 million,1 but that tournament’s most outstanding player, Shabazz Napier, said 
there are nights he goes to bed hungry because his grant-in-aid scholarship meal plan does not 
sustain him with even the most basic of life’s necessities – food.2 Mr. Napier and countless other 
student-athletes who generate revenue for their schools operate under an arcane paternalistic 
arrangement where their working conditions are dictated exclusively by the institutions they 
attend.  Characterizing these student-athletes as employees is not only a more accurate reflection 
of their role within a school, but it will provide these young athletes with the freedom to engage 
in collective bargaining and achieve a more equitable playing field. 
College athletics have drastically changed over the past few decades to the point where 
student-athletes hardly resemble students at all anymore. Rather, they are participants in a mega 
industry that brings in enormous revenues, but only allocates a miniscule fraction to the grant-in-
                                                
1Mark Alesia, NCAA approaching $1 billion per year amid challenges by players, The Indianapolis Star, (March 27, 
2014), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/2014/03/27/ncaa-approaching-billion-per-year-amid-challenges-
players/6973767/  
2Scott Phillips, Shabazz Napier: ‘there are hungry nights that I go to bed and I’m starving’ (April 7, 2014) 
http://collegebasketballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/04/07/shabazz-napier-there-are-hungry-nights-that-i-go-to-bed-and-
im-starving/  
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aid scholarships for the student-athletes. In light of this and the extensive control exerted over 
them, student-athletes more closely resemble employees, and therefore should be afforded 
protections and rights inherent in an employment relationship. Based on recent trends, the 
NCAA appears to be feeling the pressure of a changing landscape. 
In section II of my paper I will discuss the general background and issues at play under 
the current NCAA model. In section III, I will advocate that college athletes in revenue 
producing sports ought to be considered employees under the law – the pivotal conclusion 
reached in the Northwestern decision that the full Board ought to affirm upon review. I will 
discuss in section IV what the possible ramifications of the Northwestern decision are, and 
before concluding, I will discuss alternatives to collective bargaining in section V, and what the 
future of the relationship between the NCAA and student-athletes may be. 
II. Background Facts and Issues Currently Facing the NCAA 
On January 28, 2014, Northwestern University football players for the first time in the 
history of college sports filed a petition for an election with the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”), indicating they were interested in unionization. Remarkably, in a decision that has 
sparked intense debate, the NLRB Regional Director for Region 13 found that Northwestern 
University student-athlete football players who received grant-in-aid scholarships are 
“employees” under the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).3 For many, the 
Board’s decision was long overdue – an essential step towards to leveling a playing field that has 
                                                
3 Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359, at 2 (Mar. 26, 2014) (decision finding that players receiving 
scholarships are employees and ordering election within the bargaining unit) [hereinafter the “Northwestern case”]. 
The National Labor Relations Board has since agreed to review the Regional Director's decision and has invited 
interested parties to file amicus briefs to inform its decision. Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359 (Apr. 
24, 2014) (order granting Northwestern's request for review of the decision); Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-
RC-121359 (May 12, 2014). 
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historically benefitted only one side of the ledger sheet.   For others, the Board’s decision marked 
the beginning of the end of college sports. 
Current NCAA president, Mark Emmert, states, “To be perfectly frank, the notion of 
using a union employee model to address the challenges that do exist in intercollegiate athletics 
is something that strikes most people as a grossly inappropriate solution to the problems. It 
would blow up everything about the collegiate model of athletics.”4 
Perhaps the NCAA model should be thoroughly overhauled, especially when people like 
Emmert are earning annual salaries in excess of $1.7 million and the student-athletes who serve 
as the foundation of the NCAA model are unable to share a cent.5 Even more egregious than the 
inability of student-athletes to tap into the revenue they generate for their respective schools is 
the fact that many are denied even the most fundamental of protections. 
Indeed, there is something grossly unfair in the notion that billions of dollars are made 
primarily because of the performances and hard work of student-athletes, and yet they can only 
receive limited grant-in-aid scholarships that do not fully cover the cost of living and can be 
terminated on a whim by the universities due to injuries or poor performances. Furthermore, 
many student-athletes are unable to take advantage of the education their scholarship covers due 
to their responsibilities in their respective sports.  
All-Pro NFL cornerback and former Stanford University graduate, Richard Sherman once 
commented on the life of a student-athlete and said, “People think, ‘Oh, you're on scholarship.’ 
                                                
4Tom Fornelli, NCAA president Mark Emmert against NCAA union, (April 6, 2014), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/24517018/ncaa-president-emmert-against-ncaa-
union  
5 Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA's 'No Pay' Rules Violate 
Section One of the Sherman Act, Case Western Reserve Law Review, Volume 64, Issue 1 (Fall 2013). 
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They pay for your room and board, they pay for your education, but to their knowledge, you're 
there to play football. You're not on scholarship for school and it sounds crazy when a student-
athlete says that, but… coaches tell them every day: ‘You're not on scholarship for school.’”6 
This encapsulates the most dramatic holding of the Northwestern case –student-athletes are not 
primarily students.7 
Some have even gone as far as calling for a complete reevaluation of the amateur model 
of the NCAA, so that student-athletes can profit off their athletic abilities and be compensated 
according to their fair market value for their abilities and likeness.8 However, while people like 
Mark Edelman claim the NCAA’s current principles of amateurism violate the Sherman 
Antitrust Act and demand compensation including wages, student-athletes like Kain Colter and 
the other Northwestern University football players who filed a petition to be recognized as 
employees for collective bargaining purposes have a much simpler goal in mind than the 
demolition of the amateurism model and the ability to earn compensation; they seek basic 
protections and rights such as medical benefits for the inevitable injuries that accompany intense 
collegiate athletic competitions and the ability to meet their basic costs of living.9  
In Colter’s words, “The action we're taking isn't because of any mistreatment by 
Northwestern…We love Northwestern. The school is just playing by the rules of their governing 
body, the NCAA. We're interested in trying to help all players – at USC, Stanford, Oklahoma 
State, everywhere. It's about protecting them and future generations to come… Right now the 
                                                
6Jerry Hinnen, Seahawks' Richard Sherman, Michael Bennett blast NCAA, (January 30, 2015) 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/25009747/seahawks-richard-sherman-michael-
bennett-blast-ncaa  
7 Northwestern Univ., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-121359, at 18. 
8 Marc Edelman, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men’s College Basketball, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 861 
(2002). 
9 Mike Wise, Kain Colter’s unionization effort is fueled by compassion, common sense, The Washington Post (April 
12, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/colleges/mike-wise-kain-colters-unionization-effort-
is-fueled-by-compassion-common-sense/2014/04/12/0053300e-c285-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html  
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NCAA is like a dictatorship. No one represents us in negotiations. The only way things are going 
to change is if players have a union.”10 Kolter’s comments strike at the heart of what collective 
bargaining seeks to do – provide a voice to the underrepresented and underpowered to ensure 
fairer treatment. 
III. College Athletes in Revenue Producing Sports Are Employees 
The holding of the Northwestern decision was quite simple; football players receiving 
scholarships from Northwestern University are “employees” under section 2(3) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, and are therefore allowed to conduct an election under the Regional 
Director for an appropriate bargaining unit.11 Given the potential ramifications of Northwestern, 
a closer look at its facts, holding, and reasoning is warranted.  
The case centers on the College Athletes Players Association (CAPA) and student-
athletes including former quarterback Kain Colter asserting that Northwestern University 
football players receiving grant-in-aid scholarships from the University are “employees” under 
the meaning of the Labor Relations Act.12 Northwestern University is the “employer” as a 
private, non-profit, non-sectarian university chartered by the State of Illinois. Northwestern is a 
member of the NCAA, and 500 of its 8,400 students participate in a varsity athletic sports.13 The 
Northwestern football team has 112 players, including 85 receiving scholarships.14 These 
scholarships are around $61,000 each academic year in total compensation, including tuition, 
                                                
10 Tom Farrey, Kain Colter starts union movement, ESPN (January 28, 2014),  
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-football-players-trying-join-
labor-union  
11 Northwestern, at 2 
12 Id. at 2. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 3.  
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room, and board.15 During players’ first two years on campus, they live in the dorm rooms, and 
the scholarships cover the dorm costs and a meal card.16 In contrast, the players who are 
upperclassmen can elect to live off campus, and scholarship players are provided a monthly 
stipend totaling between $1,200 and $1,600 to cover their living expenses,17 which is just above 
the poverty line.18 
The National College Player Association and Drexel University Department of Sport 
Management conducted a joint study, which shockingly revealed that the average “full ride” 
scholarship fails to cover approximately $3222 of necessary cost of living expenses per student-
athlete in 2010-11, requiring the athletes to cover the difference out of their personal pockets.19 
Furthermore, the room and board provisions in a full scholarship leave 85% of players living on 
campus and 86% of players living off campus living below the federal poverty line.20 
Despite their sports and schools failing to adequately provide for them, student-athletes 
still commit an extensive amount of time and energy to their sports. In the Northwestern case, the 
athletes committed a minimum fifty to sixty hours each week for football related activities during 
training camp,21 and forty to fifty hours each week outside of training camp in addition to their 
educational demands each week.22 Technically, the NCAA rules are supposed to limit the 
countable athletically related activities to four hours per day, but certain activities such as travel, 
training meetings, “voluntary” weight training and strength conditioning, and training tape 
                                                
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, Inc., Federal Poverty Guidelines – 2015, Massachusetts Legal Services 
(January 21, 2015) http://www.masslegalservices.org/content/federal-poverty-guidelines-2015  
19 Huma, R., & Staurowsky, E. J. (2012). The $6 billion heist: Robbing college athletes under the guise of 
amateurism. A report collaboratively produced by the National College Players Association and Drexel University 
Sport Management. Available online at http://www.ncpanow.org 
20 Id. 
21 Northwestern, at 3. 
22 Id. at 6.  
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review do not constitute countable athletically related activities according to the NCAA rules.23 
Therefore, student-athletes consistently must perform well over what would constitute a full-
time, forty hour a week job for a non-student-athlete. 
The players are also subject to special team and athletic department rules not applicable 
to the general student body, including restrictions on their social media activities, a prohibition 
on swearing in public, and a requirement of mandatory study halls.24 These factors are important 
for showing the players are under the control of the university, and distinguishing their 
scholarships from the financial aid the general student body receives.  
Indeed, as the NLRB observed, “the record makes it clear that [Northwestern’s] 
scholarship players are identified and recruited in the first instance because of their football 
prowess and not because of their academic achievement in high school”25 Many schools have 
wide gaps between the average GPAs and SAT scores of their student-athletes and their general 
student body.26 Kain Colter testified he had hoped to go to medical school after his time playing 
football at Northwestern, but when he attempted to take a required chemistry course his 
sophomore year, his coaches and advisors discouraged him from taking it because it conflicted 
with morning football practices.27 Colter’s story is not unique, as sports related activities almost 
always trump academic activities for student-athletes. 
As discussed previously, the financial disparity between what student-athletes are given 
and what revenues the student-athletes help bring in is astounding. Northwestern University’s 
                                                
23 Id. at 6. 
24 Id. at 4.  
25 Id. at 9.  
26 Alison Go, Athletes Show Huge Gaps in SAT Scores, (December 30, 2008) 
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/paper-trail/2008/12/30/athletes-show-huge-gaps-in-sat-scores (stating that 
“Football players average 220 points lower on the SAT than their classmates. Men's basketball was 227 points 
lower.”) 
27 Northwestern, at 11.  
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football team generated $30.1 million in gross revenue and $8.4 million in net profit in 2012-
2013.28 Northwestern has 112 football players, 85 of whom receive scholarship money totaling 
approximately $61,000 annually, or $5.185 million in aggregate.29  
The central issue at play in Northwestern is whether football players can be considered 
“employees” under section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. The aforementioned section 
provides: 
(3)  The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall 
include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained 
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any 
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or 
person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual 
having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or 
any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from 
time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.30 
 
The above is a broad definition of an employee, and the plain language of the statute 
makes it clear that student-athletes are not among some of the few articulated exceptions that 
cannot be considered employees. The U.S. Supreme Court has held it is necessary to consider the 
common law definition of an “employee” in the application of this broad definition.31 The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric is highly influential, as it holds 
that the common law defines an employee as a person who (1) performs services for another 
under a contract of hire, (2) subject to the other’s control or right of control, and (3) in return for 
payment.32 If these three requirements can be proven, then grant-in-aid scholarship student-
athletes can prevail in the pending review of the Regional Director’s decision by the NLRB, and 
                                                
28 Id. at 13. 
29 Id. at 3. 
30 29 USC § 152(3) 
31 NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995). 
32 Brown University, 342 NLRB 483, 40, fn. 27 (2004) (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85 at 94) 
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student-athletes everywhere would be one step closer to finally attaining a seat at the bargaining 
table with the NCAA. However, in addition to satisfying the above common law test for what an 
employee is, employees in a university setting must also satisfy a statutory test and demonstrate 
they are not “primarily students.”33 This additional test may prove problematic for student-
athletes in non-revenue producing sports to assert their relationship to the school is primarily a 
commercial and economic one, so they ought to be considered employees as well. 
1) Student-Athletes Perform Services for their Schools under a Contract of Hire 
The first prong of the common law definition of an employee that must be satisfied is 
showing the student-athletes perform services for their schools under a contract of hire.  This 
requirement appears to be satisfied in the student-athlete context because the Regional Director 
in Northwestern found the football players clearly perform valuable services for the school.34 
Because it is so readily apparent the student-athletes perform valuable services for the schools, it 
is unlikely this prong will be a seriously contested factor in future unionization debates or the 
pending review of the Regional Director’s decision.  
Although it was not discussed at length in the Northwestern case, the Regional Director 
also had to find the “tender” that players are required to sign before the beginning period of each 
scholarship constituted the requisite contract of hire. One of the pivotal issues in determining 
whether the Regional Director’s decision will stand on review by the full Board is whether this 
tender can properly be considered a contract of hire.  
A case that supports an employer-employee relationship despite a lack of a formal 
employment contract for hire is Seattle Opera v. NLRB where supplemental choir members of 
                                                
33 Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete; the College Athlete as 
Employee, 81 Wash. L. Rev. 71, 92-93 (2006). 
34 Northwestern, at 14. 
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the Seattle Opera were found to be an appropriate collective bargaining unit. 35 Although not 
working under any particular employment contract, the choristers were required to sign letters of 
understanding and intent agreeing to adhere to the attendance and decorum requirements spelled 
out in a handbook provided by the opera.36 This case suggests a contract of hire can be a variety 
of things; it can be express or implied, oral or written, so long as the employer has the power or 
right to control and direct the employee in the material details of how the work is to be 
performed.37 There is a strong argument that the tender signed by student-athletes should serve 
as an employment contract of hire, as it lays out the conditions that must be followed for their 
scholarship, and the extensive team and athletic department rules also demonstrate the extent of 
control a school has over a student-athlete. 
The case that the NCAA will hope the full NLRB finds most persuasive is Brown 
University and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement 
Workers of America, UAW AFL-CIO, Petitioner, 342 NLRB 483 (2004).38 In Brown University, 
the Petitioner contended that the petitioned-for Teaching Assistants, Research Assistants, and 
proctors were employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) and that they constituted an 
appropriate unit for collective bargaining.39  
The Board in Brown University determined that graduate student assistants were admitted 
into, not hired by, a university.40 Specifically, in footnote 27, the Board stated, 
                                                
35 292 F.3d 757 
36 Id. at 765. 
37 Id. at 762 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85) 
38 Brown University and International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers 
of America, UAW AFL-CIO, Petitioner, 342 NLRB 483 (2004).38 
39 Id. at 483. 
40 Id. at 490.  
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Here, graduate student assistants are not “hired” to serve as graduate teaching or research 
assistants. They are admitted to a graduate program that includes a requirement for 
service as a graduate student assistant. The teaching and research are not performed “for” 
the university, as such, but rather as an integral part of the student's educational course of 
study. The financial arrangements for graduate student stipends further confirm the 
fundamentally educational nature of service as a TA or RA, as the stipends are based 
upon status--enrollment in a graduate program. They do not depend on the nature or 
value of the services provided, and, thus, are not a quid pro quo for services rendered. 
 
It certainly could be argued that football players are in a similar situation, where they 
should not be considered “hired” to serve as football players, but rather admitted to the schools 
under a football scholarship that requires them to play football. This is likely going to be a highly 
debated and closely decided portion of the full Board’s review, but the reasoning of the Regional 
Director was sound in finding the statutory test inapplicable in the case “because the football-
related duties are unrelated to their academic studies, unlike the graduate assistants whose 
teaching and research duties were inextricably related to their graduate degree requirements…”41 
Thus, Brown University essentially means that students who work for their universities in an 
educational and noneconomic context are not employees; however, it should be readily apparent 
that the situation of student-athletes is quite distinguishable from that of graduate assistant 
students.42   
One of the primary contentions of the alleged employer school in Brown University was 
that the graduate students could not be considered employees because “the relationship between 
                                                
41 Northwestern, at 18.  
42 McCormick, at 95-96. “when the students' efforts are predominantly academic and not economic, then those 
individuals are not employees within the meaning of the Act. Conversely, when a student who works for his 
university performs services that are not primarily educational or academic and his relationship to the university 
with respect to those services is an economic one, then the student may be an employee under the Act, provided that 
he also meets the common law test for that term.” 
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a research university and its graduate students is not fundamentally an economic one but an 
educational one.”43 
There is a strong argument that Brown University is entirely distinguishable from 
Northwestern because the football players appear to have a relationship with the school that is 
not fundamentally educational. However, it could be argued that similar to the situation in Brown 
University, the first prerequisite of being a student-athlete is being a student,44 and therefore, 
student-athletes should be considered primarily students attending college for educational 
purposes. The determining factor in the Board’s decision on review is whether the Board will 
consider the reasoning in Brown University or Northwestern to be more persuasive. There is 
certainly existing precedent to suggest a sports scholarship tender agreement can serve as a 
contract of hire between a student-athlete and a university.45 
The football players in the Northwestern case are not disputing the fact they are students; 
however, they assert they are not primarily students. On a related topic, at one point in time 
janitors and professors could not unionize because the NLRA did not apply to universities, as 
universities were not a commercial enterprise.46 A cursory glance at the massive revenues 
brought in by men’s basketball and football quickly dispels the notion those sports are not 
commercial enterprises, so it should follow that athletes in those sports should be able to 
unionize in the near future, because their relationship is primarily economic and commercial, not 
educational.  
                                                
43 Id. at 486. 
44 Id. at 488. 
45 See Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 33 Cal. Rptr. 169, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (finding a contract of 
employment between a football player and a state college). 
46 NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 679-80 (U.S. 1980) (quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 
U.S. 490, 504-505 (1979). (stating “There is no evidence that Congress has considered whether a university faculty 
may organize for collective bargaining under the Act. Indeed, when the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts were 
approved, it was thought that congressional power did not extend to university faculties because they were employed 
by nonprofit institutions which did not ‘affect commerce.’”) 
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2) Student-Athletes are Subject to their Respective School’s Control 
The second element that needs to be show under the common law definition of employee 
is one of the easier ones for student-athletes to satisfy, and it highlights why student-athletes 
ought to be given a voice to bargain with the NCAA. Student-athletes often have their days 
planned out entirely for them, from as early as 5:45 a.m. to 10:30 p.m.47 Coaches maintain 
extensive control over student-athletes, including restrictions on living arrangements, outside 
employment, off campus travel, social medial and internet use, and consumption of alcohol.48 
With so many rules and regulations, student-athletes must toe the line to ensure they are not in 
danger of losing their scholarship. The extensive control exercised by universities and the 
prioritizing of athletics over academics demonstrate the fact that students are not in school 
primarily for their education; rather they are there to compete in their respective sports. 
It seems fairly evident even at a cursory glance at the schedule of a student-athlete that 
they are subject to the extensive control of the universities and their sports teams. Professors 
McCormick state “Indeed, employee-athletes are subject to more control by their universities 
than is any other employee or group of employees at their institutions.”49 Not only are student-
athletes required to report to weightlifting as early as 5:30 in the morning, but arriving late for 
practice is not permitted and is often punished.50 Multiple late arrivals or breaches of the rigorous 
team rules can result in a player being kicked off the team and having his scholarship taken 
away.51 In addition to the control the coaches exert over the student-athletes in monitoring their 
                                                
47 Northwestern, at 15.  
48 Id. at 16. 
49 McCormick, at FN 123 “What other university employee is subject to such control by his supervisor that he must 
lift weights at 5:30 a.m., run in the summer sun, and seek permission to leave campus during summertime off hours, 
or risk termination? See Part III.A.1-2.” 
50 Id. at 100. 
51 Id. 
-14- 
 
daily practice activities, meals, and workouts, the NCAA requires each player take a full time 
course load of at least 12 credit hours each semester.52 Probably the time of year that exemplifies 
the most extreme amount of control over the student-athletes playing football is during the 
preseason camp in August, just before the start of the season.53 The Professors McCormick 
gained the following insight after speaking to several student-athletes anonymously: 
During this most intensive training period, players are effectively "on duty" from 6:30 
a.m. to 10:00 p.m. six days a week. They must participate in three arduous full-contact 
practices every two days. The physical regimen during this pre-season period is 
legendary. Designed to harden the players for the rigors of the upcoming season, this 
boot-camp-like experience includes weightlifting, running, meetings, and group meals 
and is universally considered to be exhausting and brutal. 
 
It is impossible to think of another job that demands so much of its employees – likely 
because employees in other jobs are actually recognized as such, and permitted to bargain 
collectively for better treatment and safer conditions. The extensive control universities exert 
over student-athletes highlights the need for collective bargaining so the rights of student-athletes 
are properly respected and protected. 
3) Student-Athletes Compete in Return for Payment 
 The third and final prong under the common law definition of an employee may present 
the largest hurdle Kain Colter and CAPA face on review of the full Board. Employees must 
perform their work in return for payment, and Brown University held that graduate assistants’ 
compensation was not pay for services performed, but rather financial aid to attend the 
university.54 Furthermore, Brown University held that the compensation given to the students is 
financial aid when it is the same as that received by other students not required to teach or 
                                                
52 Id. at 101. 
53 Id. at 103. 
54 Id. at 20 (citing Brown University at 488-89). 
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research and not tied to the quality of their work.55 This is readily distinguishable from the 
situations faced by student-athletes, however, because student-athletes can have their 
scholarships immediately cancelled if they cease to play their sports or violate any sort of team 
rules. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the scholarship is tied to their athletics participation, unlike 
other students, and can be classified as payment, rather than financial aid. This is going to be a 
tightly contested issue in the Board’s review, and appears to be the toughest prong of the 
common law definition of employee to satisfy.  
 The heart of the Board’s review will likely center on two conclusions reached by the 
NLRB Regional Director. First, the Regional Director reached the conclusion that scholarship 
football players are not primarily students, which many find shocking, given their very title as 
“student-athletes.”56 While it seems like a revolutionary concept to assert that student-athletes 
attending college required to maintain a certain grade point average are not primarily students, 
this conclusion makes sense upon careful consideration of what the life of a student-athlete looks 
like on a regular basis. Student-athletes spend a significantly larger portion of time performing 
their athletic duties than their academic obligations.  
 The second controversial holding that will be pivotal in the Board’s review is how the 
NLRB Regional Director distinguished the Brown University test by holding that scholarship 
compensation is not financial aid. This debate can best be explained by comparing the 
scholarships of student-athletes to the scholarships of non-student-athletes.57 Ever since the 1956 
NCAA Convention, schools have been permitted to pay for all the educational expenses of 
student-athletes based on their athletic ability alone without any consideration of their academic 
                                                
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 18. 
57 Id. at 20. 
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potential.58 Thus, it is clear that the scholarships of student-athletes are not based on 
consideration of academic potential, like the general student body scholarships. 
 If the Board plans on reversing the Regional Director’s decision and following the 
holding of Brown University, then it will likely be for one of the two reasons listed above. 
However, there are some people who suggest the current majority on the Board favor 
reconsidering and reversing Brown University.59 To wit, in 2012 a Board majority granted 
review in cases concerning graduate student assistants at New York University and Polytechnic 
Institute of New York University, and invited amici briefs for the express purpose of aiding the 
Board in reconsidering Brown University.60 
 The NLRB review will hinge on whether Brown University applies. If the Board affirms 
that student-athletes should be considered employees, which is the correct holding based on the 
applicable case law, then the impact will be felt across the NCAA. Northwestern players have 
already voted on whether they would be represented by collective bargaining on April 25, 2014, 
but the NLRB said the results of the vote will not be made public until that review of the 
Regional Director’s decision is finished. At this time, the review is still unfinished, but the full 
NLRB could hand down a decision any day now. The following sections shall discuss the 
ramifications of either affirming or reversing the Regional Director’s decision, and assert that an 
affirmation is the correct decision, consistent with prior case law and in the best interests of 
protecting the student-athletes involved. 
                                                
58 See McCormick at 111-112, stating “Once universities began compensating students solely for their athletic 
services, they fulfilled the compensation requirement of the common law test, 168Link to the text of the note 
thereby propagating the employment relation with their athletes.” 
59 Practical Law Labor & Employment, Expert Q&A with Brian Hayes on the NLRB's Northwestern University 
Decision and Pending Football Player Union Election, Practical Law (April 8, 2014), available at 
http://us.practicallaw.com/6-564-0603  
60Id. citing N.Y. Univ., No. 02-RC-023481, 2012 WL 2366171 (N.L.R.B.) (June 22, 2012) and No. Polytechnic Inst. 
of N.Y. Univ., 29-RC-012054, 2012 WL 2366170 (N.L.R.B.) (June 22, 2012)) 
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IV. Ramifications of the Northwestern Case 
Because the NLRB only has statutory jurisdiction over private sector employers, and 
consequently private colleges like Northwestern, many people believe the Northwestern case will 
be limited in impact. Fifty four of the sixty two schools in the “Power Five” conferences are 
public universities, and collective bargaining in the context of public universities is governed by 
state public-sector collective bargaining laws. So the Northwestern case can serve as precedent 
only for other private universities, and even the holding as it applies to some private universities 
such as religious schools might be limited by the case of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., where 
teachers at Catholic high schools and religious schools were excluded from the jurisdiction of the 
NLRA on First Amendment grounds.61 
State public-sector collective bargaining laws vary greatly from state to state.62 Some 
states may have laws that are favorable to collective bargaining in a public university setting; 
however, some states have laws that are extremely unfavorable.63 Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming all do not permit collective bargaining by any public employees,64 and 
therefore, it follows that student-athletes of public universities in these states might not be 
afforded collective bargaining privileges at all. There are also some states which permit 
collective bargaining only for some specific public employees who work in public safety.65 
                                                
61NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979) (holding “Accordingly, in the absence of a clear 
expression of Congress' intent to bring teachers in church-operated schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we 
decline to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive 
questions arising out of the guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.”) 
62 Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton, A Union of Amateurs: A Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College 
Athletics, Buffalo Law Review Vol. 60, 1003 (2012)   
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 1068. 
65 Id.  
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However, there are cases to suggest student-athletes at public universities could bargain 
for protections under state collective bargaining laws. In Florida, the case of Utd. Faculty of Fla. 
v. Bd. Of Regents was factually similar to Brown University, but it involved public school 
graduate assistants instead.66  Initially, the Florida Public Employee Relations Commission 
allowed public school graduate assistants to unionize, but then the legislature amended the public 
bargaining statute to exclude graduate students from its definition of public employee.67 The 
Florida Court of Appeals held that this violated the Florida Constitution, which provided that the 
rights of employees to bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged.68 The court held the 
graduate assistants were employees, and stated the following: 
It cannot be doubted that graduate assistants are “students in institutions of higher 
learning,” they are all university students pursuing advanced degrees. But that is not all 
they are. They all perform work for the various universities operated by the board, their 
work is of benefit to the universities for which it is performed, the work is performed 
subject to the supervision and control of professors who are employees of the several 
universities, and the work is performed in exchange for the payment of money by the 
board to the graduate assistants who perform the work. A more classic example of an 
employer-employee relationship can hardly be imagined. 
 
Based on the above language, it appears that the public collective bargaining definition of 
employee is even broader than the definition used in private universities as set forth by the 
NLRB in Brown University. In jurisdictions like Florida, public university student-athletes would 
actually have an easier time forming collective bargaining units. Still, with a fair number of 
states who do not permit collective bargaining by public employees whatsoever as a blanket rule, 
and many more limiting the ability of collective bargaining to certain categories, it is a valid 
concern that public universities might lag behind private ones in collective bargaining. The 
                                                
66 Utd. Faculty of Fla. V. Bd. Of Regents, 417 So. 2d 1055 (1982) 
67 Fram & Frampton at 1068. 
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varied and inconsistent laws from state to state may prompt other reform or legislation, or some 
have argued there are other routes that public university student-athletes can take, such as 
asserting they should be considered employees under laws protecting individual rights.69  
Many recent legal actions and decisions indicate the NCAA is on the brink of major 
reform and restructuring. In O’Bannon v. NCAA, the Ninth Circuit ruled that student-athletes can 
be compensated for their likenesses, which seems like an ominous sign for the NCAA’s 
amateurism model.70 The original complaint in O’Bannon was filed as an antitrust complaint 
against the NCAA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.71 The 
complaint alleged that the NCAA and its members violated Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act by “conspiring to fix the prices they received for the use and sale of former student-athletes 
images, likenesses and/or names at zero dollars.” In a surprising decision, the court held student-
athletes can be compensated for their likenesses, and thus shook the foundations of the notion 
that college athletics system is strictly an amateur model. 
The discussion of amateurism is for another day, however, and is beyond the premise of 
this paper. The United States Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, even recognized how 
the “NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in 
college sports… [and] needs ample latitude to play that role.” 72 
There is no question that these cases demonstrate how the amateur status claimed by the 
NCAA is possibly becoming outdated and unrepresentative of the college athletic industry. The 
issue of compensating collegiate student-athletes and revising the “no pay” provisions of the 
                                                
69 Steven L. Willborn, College Athletes as Employees: An Overflowing Quiver, 69 U. Miami L. Rev. 65, (2014). 
70 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014) 
71 Id. 
72 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 US 85, 101 (U.S. 1984) 
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NCAA is an entirely different matter from unionization, however, and although many student-
athletes would desire monetary compensation, far more are simply looking for added protections 
of medical coverage and cost of living stipends via of collective bargaining. 
The issue of unionization should not be confused with the issue of professionalization 
and the debate over amateurism in the NCAA; they are seeking to achieve two very distinct 
goals. When courts like the Ninth Circuit in the O’Bannon case permit student-athletes to 
recover compensation for use of their likeness, it only serves to solidify the fact that student-
athletes have an entire host of rights that are not being protected under the current NCAA 
system. Legal recognition of college athletes as “employees” might actually serve to promote the 
values of amateurism after full considerations of what unions ultimately do.73 As Fram and 
Frampton state in their excellent Buffalo Law Review note, 
On one view, unions’ raison d’être is to win monopoly wage gains for their members—a 
purpose that is oddly out of place in the context of “amateur” competition. An alternative 
approach, however, recasts the debate in political, rather than strictly economic, terms. 
“industrial democracy” understanding of collective bargaining, the role of the union “is to 
democratize the employment relationship by balancing power, providing employees 
a voice in the determination of the terms and conditions of employment, and 
insuring that due process of law is followed in [the workplace context].”74 (emphasis 
added) 
 
Amateurism is fundamentally about fair play, democratic participation and giving a voice 
to all participants. The NCAA claims it is organized for the benefit and recreation of the student-
athletes playing the sports, but how it operates thoroughly deprives student-athletes of the ability 
to participate in the decisions that govern their lives. 75 Unionization could remedy this 
imbalance of power. 
                                                
73 Fram & Frampton, at 1010. 
74 Id. at 1072. 
75 Id. at 1073. 
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As far as what a union of amateur college athletes could seek to achieve in collective 
bargaining,, players could seek a reduced work load, limits on the number of games played 
during exam periods, additional time off during the holidays, and a stricter enforcement of the 
NCAA’s “20-hour limit” rule, so practice times are limited to an appropriate and reasonable 
length.76 Additionally, admirable goals for collective bargaining could include a stipend that 
more accurately reflects the true cost of attending college, better health insurance, guaranteed 
scholarships that are irrevocable regardless of injury or performance, access to a full range of 
majors and programs, more time to pursue academic coursework, or healthcare coverage and 
paid medical expenses for sports related injuries. 
In response to the turbulent atmosphere surrounding it, the NCAA has recently passed 
legislation that includes a “cost of attendance” measure to supplement student-athletes’ 
scholarships with dollars to help pay for housing, food, and other basic costs student-athletes 
accrue while attending college.77 This is a small step taken by the NCAA, and only applicable to 
the largest schools that are members of the “Power Five” conferences,78 but it is only a matter of 
time before there are heightened protections for NCAA student-athletes, and the Northwestern 
Case is at the very heart of driving this change. It is unfortunate that the NCAA has been so 
reactionary in its reform, and only responded with this cost of attendance stipend after 
heightened media scrutiny, but at least it was a positive step, even if it was more for public 
relations than actual reform. This new stipend does not require any school to increase aid to the 
full costs of attendance, but rather just creates an option. Ideally, some sort of collective 
bargaining system could be a much more efficient and less wasteful way to apply constant 
                                                
76 Id. at 1073. 
77 Mitch Sherman, Full cost of attendance bill passes 79-1, ESPN, (January 18, 2015), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/12185230/power-5-conferences-pass-cost-attendance-measure-ncaa-autonomy-begins  
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pressure on the NCAA to reform. The slow and costly litigation that is currently the driving force 
of change is cumbersome and exhausting.  
Ultimately, what is important is giving athletes a voice to decide what they want rather 
than the NCAA deciding what it thinks athletes want. The paternalistic current NCAA model is 
outdated, and unionization for student-athletes in revenue generating sports treats the student-
athletes with greater human dignity and a proper appreciation of what they have worked so hard 
to produce and generate for their respective schools. 
As with any major shift in an area of law, there would be a host of uncertainties if NCAA 
student-athletes in revenue generating sports were granted the right to collective bargaining. For 
example, there are policy arguments to consider such as whether the NCAA would have 
adequate resources, or whether this would affect other non-revenue producing programs that rely 
upon the sports like football and basketball to supply their scholarship funds. However, this is 
technically irrelevant for the purposes of determining employee status, as it focuses on the wrong 
flow of money. It may make for a policy argument, but ultimately the decision should come 
down to the relationship between the university and its student-athletes, as spelled out by the 
three common law elements of the employee definition in sections III(1), III(2), and III(3) of this 
paper. 
It has also been mentioned previously that allowing student-athletes in revenue 
generating sports to bargain collectively could reduce the amount of money available to non-
revenue producing sports. It certainly would pose new dilemmas to Northwestern and other 
schools if they suddenly were held accountable to provide higher protections, cost of living 
stipends, and other benefits to their men’s football and basketball players. The schools may even 
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encounter difficulties in sustaining a proportionate number of men’s and women’s sports to 
remain in compliance with Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. However, the heart 
of the matter is whether student-athletes can be considered “employees” under section 2(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act.  If they are given employee status, then this determination is 
independent of the considerations of the other programs funded by the revenues brought in by 
the football and basketball teams. The NCAA and its schools would need to address how they 
could balance protecting their revenue producing student-athletes while still funding other non-
revenue producing athletics.  
Some have asserted that the sad reality is that the less popular sports will suffer a reduced 
number of scholarships, but the free market can allow universities to determine what sports add 
value to the university.79 This pragmatic view asserts if does not add value, then the number of 
scholarships should be reduced and players will have to pay their own way.80 This seems like a 
harsh result beyond just the necessary collateral damage of a new college sports model and that 
is why this paper is arguing only for some heightened protections for student-athletes via 
collective bargaining and not a complete overhaul of the NCAA amateurism model. There needs 
to be some ability for non-revenue producing sports to exist, otherwise women’s sports and the 
vast majority of men’s collegiate athletics would cease to exist, and there would be serious Title 
IX problems. However, the bottom line is if student-athletes are found to be employees under the 
NLRA, then there are certain rights they are entitled to, and schools cannot abridge these rights 
just because they have been doing so for a lengthy period of time. It may be an adjustment, but it 
must be made if justice so requires.  
                                                
79 Zach Gorwitz, Money Madness: Why and How NCAA Athletes Should Be Paid, Duke Political Review, (October 
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Professors Robert and Amy McCormick again astutely observe that the reverberations of 
student-athletes as employees would dramatically affect the distribution of college athletics 
funds.81 The exorbitant salaries paid to coaches and spent on facilities suggest that the funds are 
available to adequately protect student-athletes in revenue producing sports and still be in 
compliance with Title IX by funding non-revenue producing sports. However, as with any major 
change, it would be impossible to project with certainty what the fallout would be from treating 
student-athletes as employees. This paper focuses on the right to collective bargaining, and does 
not purport to be a complete discussion of the Title IX ramifications, but Mark Edelman suggests 
Title IX may just be a red herring, as it currently allows for disparate treatment of men’s and 
women’s sports because of the revenue produced.82 Furthermore, Tile IX expert and Drexel 
professor, Ellen J. Staurowsky, has indicated if athletes are indeed “employees” then Title IX 
may not apply at all, as it refers to access to education.83 
Marc Edelman further argues that “despite the NCAA's assertions to the contrary, it is 
indeed possible for the NCAA and its member schools to operate at a profit even after 
compensating student-athletes for the use of their likenesses.  What would be required, however, 
would be for the NCAA to operate as a leaner, more efficient trade organization, and for NCAA 
member colleges to begin paying their presidents, athletic directors, and coaches at salary rates 
                                                
81 McCormick, at 80 FN 34, stating “Acceptance of our thesis would also have important practical implications. For 
example, given the dependence of all other collegiate sports upon the revenue generated by football and men’s 
basketball, how would these other sports be funded? How would universities comply with other laws, such as Title 
IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2000), requiring equal treatment of women’s sports? The practical reverberations of 
our thesis are many, and plainly beyond the scope of this Article. It seems fair to say, however, that most involve a 
reslicing of the rich pie of college athletics.” 
82 Marc Edelman, When It Comes To Paying College Athletes, Title IX Is Just A Red Herring, Forbes, (February 4, 
2014), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/02/04/when-it-comes-to-paying-college-
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/sports/impact-of-northwestern-ruling-on-womens-sports-is-
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that are more reflective of the free market. Much like many other monopolist trade associations, 
the NCAA currently operates inefficiently.”84  
While it is not necessarily going to be easy to prove the NCAA can operate at a profit and 
be able to fund non-revenue producing sports, there is a lot to be said about the current way in 
which the large NCAA revenues are distributed. In forty of the fifty U.S. states, the highest paid 
public official is currently the head coach of a state university's football or men's basketball 
team.85 College football coaches like Nick Saban at Alabama University and Mark Dantonio at 
Michigan State University reportedly earn annual salaries over $7.9 million and $5.6 million, 
respectively.86 These coaches are only able to be paid these stratospheric salaries because 
universities are not required to spend much at all on the welfare of their student-athletes. If 
Edelman is correct in his assertion that the NCAA could even survive and operate at a profit after 
compensating student-athletes are fair market value, then it follows that there at least should be 
adequate financial power to offer heightened protections for student-athletes such as guaranteed 
scholarships, better medical insurance coverage, and a cost of living stipend. 
The current system really is a form of wage theft in the fact that it takes the excess profits 
generated by revenue producing sports – men’s basketball and football, usually – and transfers 
them to non-revenue producing sports. It is not fair to require men’s basketball and football 
players to give up on any heightened protections that additional finances could provide them in 
order to fund another endeavor that the general public does not pay as much to come and 
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support. This redistribution of resources is particularly troublesome in light of the fact that a 
large percentage of men’s basketball and football players are racial minorities, and under the 
current system, the value they generate is being used to compensate primarily Caucasian coaches 
and other non-revenue producing sports with less racial minority participation in general.87  
It is not proper to restrict the size of grant in aid compensation available to these often 
underprivileged athletes to transfer to other places. In some circumstances, this even shifts the 
cost on the public taxpayer, as 65% of UCLA football players receive Pell grants to attend 
college.88 If the players were granted a higher share of the revenue they generate to help pay their 
way in college, then the Pell grant funds could be allocated elsewhere. Presently, the student-
athletes in revenue producing sports are being forced to pay for something no one else is willing 
to pay for. If it is a priority to the school to have this sport, then the school must find funding in a 
way that does not deprive its revenue producing student-athletes of basic protections.  
Unionization might not be possible for non-revenue producing athletes, even those who 
presently receive grant in aid scholarship money, because in addition to meeting to common law 
three requirements in the employee definition, the student-athletes would have to meet the Brown 
University standard and show they are not primarily students. It would be much more difficult 
for a student-athlete in a non-revenue producing sport to assert his or her relationship to the 
university is primarily an economic one and not educational one. When these non-revenue 
producing student-athletes actually cost the schools money, it is difficult to argue their 
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relationship is primarily an economic or commercial one with the school. It may be that 
scholarships for student-athletes in non-revenue producing sports will need to be cut, but the 
current system raises the question of why are the student-athletes currently given scholarships to 
play a sport when that sport does not bring in any revenue. The reality is very few sports actually 
generate revenue for their universities, and the athletes who work so hard in those sports ought to 
be adequately protected.  
It does seem unfair that student-athletes in non-revenue producing sports, walk-ons, and 
division III athletes all might be excluded from the appropriate collective bargaining unit when 
each of the aforementioned categories works just as hard as revenue producing student-athletes 
for the schools. However, that appears to be what the state of the law is currently under Brown 
University and its economic realities test requiring an economic relationship. Hopefully the gains 
made by student-athletes permitted to bargain collectively can be an important stepping stone 
and lead to widespread NCAA reform for all student-athletes. The current state of the law may 
not present an ideal solution, but it is still groundbreaking and progressive. 
There are also potential worker’s compensation ramifications of recognizing student-
athletes as employees.89 In 1953, in University of Denver v. Nemeth,90 a student-athlete was 
injured, and found to be an employee for the purposes of workers’ compensation from the 
university. In response, the NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers fought hard to emphasize 
the identity of student-athletes as students, rather than athletes, so they would not be 
characterized as employees. Byers wrote on the topic: 
[The] threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be identified as employees 
by state industrial commissions and the courts. [To address that threat, w]e crafted the 
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term student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and interpretations as 
a mandated substitute for such words as players and athletes. We told college publicists 
to speak of “college teams,” not football or basketball “clubs,” a word common to the 
pros.91 
 
 
As Professors Robert and Amy McCormick observed, the response by the NCAA 
focused so intensely on requiring the use of the phrase “student-athlete” to discourage those 
student-athletes from ever being seen as employees instead of students, and that is why the 
NCAA is facing these issues currently. 92 The NCAA is well-aware of what duties would be 
owed in an employment relationship, and therefore is perfectly content to maintain the status quo 
where a minimal amount of money actually is directed towards the student-athletes. In a related 
case of Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, the court held that an injured athlete 
was not an employee for the purposes of workers’ compensation.93 However, it is interesting to 
note the court observed the injury took place in 1976, and it readily admitted that the NCAA has 
changed drastically since that time and the outcome of the case might not be the same if the 
injury occurred today.94 
Other unanswered questions include the whether federal workplace safety rules apply to 
these student-athletes who meet the definition of employees. Also, there is an issue of whether 
the value of their scholarships should be taxed as income, and if federal and state wage and hour 
laws should apply to the student-athletes. Because state workers' compensation laws are often 
considered the exclusive remedy for injured employees, it could possible mean that these statutes 
would provide the exclusive remedy for student-athletes. There are a whole host of unanswered 
questions that the impact of the Northwestern case poses going forward such as whether student-
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athletes should be included in institution-wide employee benefit plans, and if state and federal 
anti-discrimination statutes apply.95 The answers to the above are not yet clear, but if the trend 
towards recognizing the unique position NCAA student-athletes are in continues, then it will 
only be a matter of time before the NCAA, the court system, and legislatures are required to 
address the above issues. 
V. Alternatives to Collective Bargaining  
Even though collective bargaining could have an enormous impact on protections for 
NCAA student-athletes, it is currently limited in its impact to student-athletes of revenue 
generating sports at private universities under the NLRB. There are thousands of other athletes 
who work just as hard who are either not on scholarship, not in a revenue producing sport, or not 
at a school that is either private or in a state that allows for public employee collective 
bargaining. There is clearly a problem when student-athletes are not being adequately protected, 
but it is a fair question to ask whether or not collective bargaining is the proper answer. 
It is difficult to imagine what an alternative model of the NCAA looks like, mostly 
because the NCAA is a hybrid model currently – a system that has its roots in amateurism, but is 
becoming increasingly professionalized and highly lucrative. The NCAA model is on an 
unsustainable trajectory and so it has two options going forward – become a more professional 
system or revert back to a true amateurism model.  
Given the rampant growth in popularity and revenues, it is doubtful the NCAA would 
ever consider returning to a primarily educational and amateur model. There is simply too much 
money on the table. However, the alternative is a more professionalized model, which may look 
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more like a minor league of sorts for professional sports. Because amateurism and the concept of 
cheering one’s alma mater on in college athletics are cited as major reasons why the NCAA has 
had such success, it seems like an overly professionalized system would cheapen the experience. 
The athletes would have a much more tenuous connection to the university. Compensating 
student-athletes at a fair market value and overly professionalizing the NCAA may be too drastic 
a change for many to stomach.  
However, because the NCAA drags its feet at reform and has been so slow and 
reactionary in its approach to solving the current issues it faces, something drastic might be 
necessary. The current system encourages costly litigation to win certain rights from the NCAA, 
as evidence by the O’Bannon and Northwestern cases. Other alternatives include legislation or 
voluntary reform by the NCAA, but this seems like it would be a slow process that is not likely 
to happen in the immediate future. Collective bargaining could be a faster, lower cost, and more 
effective method of applying pressure for reform on the NCAA. 
A complete destruction of the amateur model should be avoided if possible, because of 
the sheer uncertainty of what system would take its place. Collective bargaining provides a 
workable alternative that can preserve some of the treasured values of the NCAA, while ensuring 
that the problems and concerns of student-athletes are adequately voiced and able to be 
addressed. What collective bargaining could do is allow the student-athletes be heard as to what 
their preferences, goals, and desires are, without completely destroying the current NCAA 
model. For too long, the NCAA has had the only opinion that matters, and if the playing field is 
leveled via collective bargaining, then perhaps college athletics could continue on as they have 
for so many years without too radical of an overhaul. Some may not like the conclusion student-
athletes are employees, but it is an inescapable conclusion under the law. 
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VI. Conclusion  
NCAA athletics have changed almost beyond recognition over the past few decades. 
Given the changed circumstances and changed relationship between universities and their 
student-athletes, it seems appropriate that the athletes in revenue producing sports be considered 
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. There is a definite imbalance of time and 
emphasis devoted to being a “student” versus being an “athlete,” and the status of those student-
athletes under the law should reflect this. 
As this paper has demonstrated, college athletes are being overworked under the most 
strenuous of conditions and are inadequate provided for and protected by the scholarships. After 
examining the true relationship between a university and its student-athletes, it is abundantly 
clear the student-athletes (1) perform services for the universities under a contract of hire, (2) are 
subject to the university’s control or right of control, and (3) in return for payment in the form of 
grant-in-aid scholarships; therefore, student-athletes are employees as a matter of law. Under 
Brown University, the relationship of employees to their universities in an educational setting 
cannot be primarily educational. Therefore, unfortunately only grant-in-aid athletes in revenue 
producing sports have a sufficiently economic relationship to be considered employees under the 
current state of the law. Because they are employees, they “shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing…”96  
Recognizing student-athletes as employees may not effectuate any change at all. It could 
be the Northwestern football players vote not to unionize, or their collective bargaining power 
might not yield any greater rights or protections. However, it is just as possible that the cases 
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coming before the NCAA might result in fundamental widespread changes and reform in the 
NCAA model. It is impossible to ascertain the future with absolute certainty, but the student-
athletes deserve at the very least a chance to be heard. The NCAA has flourished off of the hard 
work of countless student-athletes, and it seems right to give the student-athletes a voice via 
collective bargaining to better protect their interests. Recognizing what function student-athletes 
truly serve in their capacities at universities could help protect their individual rights and ensure 
they are treated as fair as possible under the circumstances and given a more level playing field 
when dealing with the NCAA. 
